On June 2, Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc sent a formal letter to U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer requesting a 16-year renewal of CUSMA. He then flew to Washington, walked into the Canadian Embassy, and sat down with Greer face to face. Chief negotiator Janice Charette was at his side. It was the most substantive Canadian diplomatic engagement of the entire review cycle.
Greer’s office issued no public statement about what was said.
Within 24 hours, the USTR released a forced labour supply chain investigation report proposing an additional 10% tariff on Canada.
That sequence tells you almost everything you need to know about the negotiating environment Canada is operating in right now.
The formal move
Canada’s renewal letter was procedurally required — Article 34.7 of CUSMA mandates that parties formally declare their intentions ahead of the July 1 Joint Review. But the content mattered. LeBlanc explicitly acknowledged that “either or both other parties may wish to propose areas where improvements may be warranted.” In diplomatic language, that’s Canada signalling it’s open to limited renegotiation. Not a blank cheque. But a door left open.
He also formally linked tariff relief and CUSMA renewal in a public document for the first time — stating that “discussions with the United States on addressing sectoral tariffs will be essential” in parallel to the review. Canada has been making this argument privately for months. Putting it in writing to Greer matters.
After the meeting, LeBlanc told reporters he was “eternally optimistic.” He also said Canada and the U.S. have “a lot of work to do” before July 1.
Both things can be true. But the second one is doing more work than the first.
The counter-escalation
The forced labour tariff proposal — an additional 10% on Canada, Mexico, the UK and others — deserves more attention than it’s getting. This is not a CUSMA instrument. It sits in a completely separate legal mechanism, one Canada has no existing strategy to contest. The IEEPA ruling, the Chapter 10 dispute process, the trilateral framework — none of it applies here.
The timing may or may not have been deliberate. Either answer is damaging. If it was deliberate, the U.S. is sending a message that Canada’s formal renewal request won’t change the negotiating temperature. If it wasn’t deliberate — if the USTR’s trade enforcement apparatus simply rolled out a pre-scheduled report the morning after Canada’s most significant diplomatic move of the review cycle — that’s a different kind of problem. It means Canada is negotiating with a counterparty that isn’t coordinating its own actions.
LeBlanc said he was optimistic. He also said there’s a lot of work to do. Both things are true. But the second one is doing more work than the first.
What the numbers say
112K private sector jobs shed Jan–Apr 2026
53% of goods exports now claim CUSMA preferences (up from 37% in 2024)
30 U.S. issues with Canada vs. 60 with Mexico
27 days to July 1
The 112,000 number is the one that changes the frame. Canada’s private sector shed those jobs in the first four months of 2026 — and the hardest-hit sectors are exactly the ones most exposed to CUSMA outcomes: mining, metals, forestry, auto parts. The abstract policy argument about trade architecture is now a labour market emergency.
The 53% number is almost as important. Canadian businesses have been flooding into CUSMA’s tariff shelter at an extraordinary rate — the share of goods exports claiming CUSMA preferences jumped 16 percentage points in a single year. That means the economic stakes of CUSMA disruption are materially higher today than they were when this review cycle began. The agreement has become more critical to Canadian exporters precisely because the tariff environment outside it has become so hostile.
The bifurcated structure
Carney confirmed this week what had been widely suspected: the U.S. is running separate negotiating tracks with Canada and Mexico. He framed it as unsurprising — the Americans have roughly 60 issues with Mexico versus 30 with Canada, so of course the discussions look different. That’s a reasonable point. Diamond Isinger, the former Trudeau special advisor on Canada-U.S. relations, went further: a similar dynamic played out in 2017-18, and Canada ultimately achieved its core objectives.
Both arguments are worth taking seriously. But they obscure a structural difference: in 2017-18, Canada was inside formal trilateral rounds even when bilateral conversations were happening in parallel. Right now, Mexico has completed one bilateral round with the U.S. and has two more scheduled in June and July. Canada has had the LeBlanc-Greer meeting and a letter. Those are not equivalent positions.
The most significant disclosure of the week came from LeBlanc himself: Greer has raised the annual review option privately, not just publicly. That matters. It means the U.S. is actively managing Canada’s expectations toward the annual review cycle, not toward a 16-year extension. Canada’s opening position and the U.S.’s internal baseline are not close.
What the next 27 days need to produce
A clean 16-year CUSMA renewal before July 1 is not achievable. Too much ground to cover, too little time, and a U.S. counterparty that is simultaneously proposing new tariffs and signalling the annual review option to Canada’s own minister.
That doesn’t mean July 1 is irrelevant. What matters is whether Canada can make enough substantive progress on the U.S.’s most tractable demands — automotive content thresholds, dairy TRQ administration at the margins, clearing some of the digital irritants — to position itself well for the annual review cycle that begins July 2. A productive first annual review cycle, with demonstrable Canadian movement on specific issues, is the most achievable path to a durable resolution before the U.S. midterms close the ratification window in late 2026.
The Carney government has a majority. It has political capital. It has a negotiating team that is experienced and unified. What it needs between now and July 1 is a concrete deliverable — something Greer can characterize as progress when he next testifies before Congress. Not a concession on supply management’s architecture. Not an energy proportionality offer. Something targeted, reversible in principle, and sufficient to move the conversation forward.
Structure before sophistication. Find the lever that works. Pull it.
Gerry Visco
Structure Before Sophistication is published monthly. The CUSMA Watch series tracks Canada’s most consequential trade negotiation in a generation. Forward to anyone who needs to understand what’s actually happening — not just what’s being said.